Abstract. A proposal in a weighted voting game is accepted if the sum of the (non-negative) weights of the "yea" voters is at least as large as a given quota. Several authors have considered representations of weighted voting games with minimum sum, where the weights and the quota are restricted to be integers. In [Freixas and Molinero(2009) ] the authors have classified all weighted voting games without a unique minimum sum representation for up to 8 voters.
Introduction
Consider a yes-no voting system for a set of n voters. The acceptance of a proposal should depend on the subset of "yea" voters. There are different concepts for the set of required features of a voting system. One is that of a weighted voting game
1
. Here we are given non-negative voting weights w i ∈ R ≥0 for the voters and a quota q ∈ R >0 . A proposal is accepted iff i∈Y w i ≥ q, where Y is the set of voters which are in favor of the proposal. In [Freixas and Molinero(2009) ] the authors restrict the weights and the quota to be integers and ask for weight representations with minimum sum. They have shown that for at most 7 voters these representations are unique. For 8 voters there are exactly 154 weighted majority games with more than one minimum sum integer weight representation. If one requires that equally desirable voters obtain equal weights one speaks of a normalized representation. Indeed all these 154 weighted games admit a unique normalized minimum sum integer weight representation. They also give some examples consisting of 10 or more voters which do not admit such a unique normalized representation. Recently the same authors have presented such examples for 9 voters in [Freixas and Molinero(2010) ]. We would like to remark minimum integer weight representations of weighted voting games are also used as a solution concept for cooperative transferable utility games, see [Sudhölter(1996) ].
1.1. Related results. Isbell [Isbell(1959) ] found an example of 12 (unsymmetric) voters without a unique minimum sum representation. Examples for 9, 10, or 11 voters are given in Molinero(2009), Freixas and Molinero(2010) ]. The enumeration of weighted voting games dates back to at least 1962 [Muroga et al.(1962) Muroga, Toda, and Kondo] , where up to 6 voters are treated. For n = 7, 8 voters we refer e. g. to [Winder(1965) , Muroga et al.(1970) Muroga, Tsuboi, and Baugh, Krohn and Sudhölter(1995) ]. Bart de Keijzer presents a promising graded poset for weighted voting games in his master thesis [Keijzer(2009) ], see also [Keijzer et al.(2010) Keijzer, Klos, and Zhang] .
2 To our knowledge, the number of weighted voting games for 9 voters has not been published before. 1.2. Our contribution. We exhaustively classify all weighted majority games consisting of 9 voters which do not admit a unique (normalized) minimum sum integer weight representation. Within this context we also enumerate the number of weighted voting games for 9 voters.
1.3. Outline of the Paper. In Section 2 we very briefly 4 state the basic definitions and facts of weighted voting games in the context of simple games. In Section 3 we describe an approach how to exhaustively enumerate weighted voting games without generating the whole set of complete simple games. The minimum sum representations are treated in Section 4.
Date: January 14, 2013. 1 Other aliases are weighted (majority) games or threshold functions. 2 We would like to remark that the counts for weighted voting games with 6 ≤ n ≤ 8 voters are wrongly stated in [Keijzer(2009) ], but the methods should work.
3 We would like to mention the (unpublished) diploma thesis [Tautenhahn(2008) ] containing the enumeration for 9 voters. 4 For a more extensive introduction we refer to [Taylor and Zwicker(1999) ].
2. Weighted voting games as a subclass of (complete) simple games Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of n voters. A pair (N, χ) is called a simple game if χ is a characteristic function of the subsets of N with χ(∅) = 0, χ(N ) = 1, and χ(U ′ ) ≤ χ(U ) for all U ′ ⊆ U . For the broad variety of applications of simple games we quote Taylor and Zwicker [Taylor and Zwicker(1999) ]: "Few structures arise in more contexts and lend themselves to more diverse interpretations than do simple games."
A well studied subclass (and superclass of weighted voting games) arises from Isbell's desirability relation [Isbell(1958) ]: We write i ⊐ j for two voters i, j ∈ N iff we have χ {i} ∪ U \{j} ≤ χ(U ) for all j ∈ U ⊆ N \{i}. A pair (N, χ) is called complete simple game if it is a simple game and the binary relation ⊐ is a total preorder. We abbreviate i ⊐ j, j ⊐ i by i j.
In the following we assume 1 ⊐ 2 ⊐ · · · ⊐ n and write coalitions U ⊆ N as characteristic vectors 5 u ∈ {0, 1} n . We call u a winning coalition iff χ(U ) = 1, otherwise we call u a losing coalition. To have a compact representation for complete simple games we need another partial ordering: For two coalitions
n we write u v iff we have
For a complete simple game we denote by W all winning coalitions which are minimal with respect to . Similarly we denote by L the set of losing coalitions which are maximal with respect to .
It is well known that each complete simple game is uniquely characterized by either W or L, see e. g. [Carreras and Freixas(1996) ]. Thus in the graph G n consisting of vertex set {0, 1}
n and edges {u, v} for all u, v ∈ {0, 1} n with u ⊲⊳ v, the cliques are in bijection to the complete simple games for n voters. Applying the software package cliquer [Niskanen andÖstergård(2003) ,Östergård (2002)], using a customary personal computer, we have the counts in Table 1 , see also [Freixas and Molinero(2010) , Kurz(2010) There are several approaches how to algorithmically check whether a complete simple games is weighted, see [Freixas and Molinero(2009) , Taylor and Zwicker(1999) ] for an overview. Minimum sum representations of complete simple games e. g. are in bijection to the solutions of the following integer linear program
which indeed was used in [Freixas and Molinero(2009)] . A complete simple game is weighted iff a solution of this integer linear program or its linear relaxation exists. As mentioned in [Freixas and Molinero(2009) ], generating all 284 · 10 9 complete simple games for 9 voters and afterwards solving the corresponding (integer) linear programs would be too time-consuming.
Partial complete simple games and similar linear programs
Suppose we want to exhaustively generate the complete simple games for a given number of voters using an orderly generation approach, see [Read(1978) ]. To be more precise, we start with an empty set W and add minimal winning coalitions, which are decreasing with respect to the lexicographical ordering 5 Another representation, which takes the possible symmetry of voters into account, is described e. g. in [Carreras and Freixas(1996) ]. There are several applications where this representation is more convenient, see e. g. [Kurz (2010)].
and condense the maximal coalitions ofL to a setL ⊆L. With this we haveL ⊆ L andL ⊆ L ′ for all successors of W .
Thus we may use the partial sets W andL of winning and losing coalitions, respectively, to check whether a feasible set of weights exists. If this is not the case we can prune the whole search tree below node W . We would like to remark, that with an increasing number of voters, this simple observation gets increasingly beneficial 7 . In order to accelerate the check whether a complete simple game is weighted we utilize the following linear program, instead of the one presented in the previous section.
w n , q ≥ 0.
Thus by using one additional variable q, the number of inequalities decreases from |W | · |L| + n − 1 to |W | + |L| + n − 1. The key idea to drastically reduce the necessary time for solving the linear programs is, that for a node W and a successor W ′ the set of variables and many inequalities coincide. So if we use the simplex method, we can perform a warm start using a feasible basis of the linear program corresponding to node W in order to solve the linear program corresponding to node W ′ . Going along this approach drastically reduces the number of performed simplex iterations, i. e. base changes, and so the overall running time. Table 2 . Weighted voting games for n voters.
By combining both ideas and using a re-implementation of the standard simplex method 8 , we were able to enumerate the weighted voting games for n ≤ 9 voters in a reasonable amount of time, see Table 2 .
Minimum sum representations
In the following a minimum sum representation is a set of integer weights w i , such that n i=1 w i is minimal. If additionally w i = w j for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n with i j, i. .e for symmetric voters, is required, we speak of a minimum sum representation preserving types, see Molinero(2009), Freixas and Molinero(2010) ] for more details and further definitions of minimum representations. Both minimum representations do exist for each weighted voting game, but need not be unique. So one can ask for a classification of the weighted voting games possessing more than one minimum sum representation (preserving types). In [Freixas and Molinero(2009) ] the authors have shown that for at most 7 voters both minimum sum representations are unique. For 8 voters the minimum sum representations preserving 6 Here one may also read the coalitions as integers written in their binary expansion and use the ordinary ordering ≤ of integers.
7 Since the numbers of weighted voting games and complete simple games coincide for n ≤ 5 voters but their ratio converges to zero with increasing n, see also Table 2 . 8 We would like to remark that it is also possible to do the enumeration for 9 voters without the presented ideas, as demonstrated in [Tautenhahn(2008) ]. Using some heuristics to find suitable weights on the one hand and to find dual multipliers of the inequalities on the other hand to prove the non-existence of weights, roughly 4 months of computation time where necessary.
types are unique and except for 154 weighted voting games also the minimum sum representations are unique. There are exactly two different minimum sum representations in these 154 cases.
9
In order to determine minimum sum representations of complete simple games and to check whether a given representation is unique we extend our linear program from Section 3. One may simply add the target function n i=1 w i and use integer variables w i . The resulting integer linear programs are that small, that a commercial solver like ILOG CPLEX, or most of the open source alternatives like e. g. GLPK, can solve them relatively fast within fractions of a second. But since the number of weighted voting games for 9 voters is huge, this is not nearly fast enough. We therefore refrain from using ILPs and use LPs instead. Actually it turned out that the linear program from the previous sections yields integral weights in all cases for at most 7 voters. For 8 voters the fractional weights are integral except for 280 cases, where the denominator equals 2.
Suppose that we have integer lower bounds u i for the weights w i available (we may use u i = 1 at the beginning. In each node W of the search tree, see Section 3, we solve the linear program:
for all i = n, . . . , 1 and update the u i with the target valuesũ i after each solving step. Since these n linear programs do not differ much, we highly benefit from warm starting at an optimal basis of the previous solution. In many cases We can iterate this process until the u i do not change any more. So finally we end up with integral lower bounds u i for the weights. If the u i realize the given complete game, then w i = u i is the unique minimum sum representation. Otherwise we store the corresponding simple game and the lower bounds u i as candidates, which have to be treated later on.
The big advantage of this approach is, that we only have to perform a very small number of simplex iterations, since the consecutive linear programs do not change too much, and that we can pass the lower bounds u i from a node W to its successor nodes W ′ . Additionally we may use duality of complete simple games.
It turned out that this approach ends up with less than a million candidates out of the 989913344 weighted voting games for 9 voters.
Using ILOG CPLEX we have determined all minimum sum representations and all minimum sum representations preserving types for these candidates separately. There remain exactly 74954 weighted voting games without a unique minimum sum representation
10
. In more than 82 % of the cases the minimum sum equals the sum of the lower bounds u i , so that the the different minimum sum representations arise from swaps within an equivalence class of voters. An example of this kind is given by quota q = 49 and weight vector w = 24 19 15 8 7 7 6 2 2 , where we use the |'s to abbreviate the equivalence classes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 6 7, and 8 9. Here we can have 3 different arrangements for the weights w 5 , w 6 , and w 7 . An example for the remaining 5189 cases is given by the quota q = 56 and weight vectors w
(1) = 23 15 13 11 9 8 3 2 2 , w (2) = 23 15 13 11 9 8 4 1 2 , or w (3) = 23 15 13 11 9 8 4 2 1 .
9 We have verified these results using our approach outlined below. 10 As a check of the correctness of our computer calculations we have verified that we have always found the dual games too. Additionally we have verified, that the list from [Freixas and Molinero(2010) ] is contained in our list.
An example for a weighted voting games without a unique minimum sum representation preserving types is given by quota q = 46 an weights In total there are 12826 such weighted voting games, where all of them have exactly two minimum sum representations preserving types. We would like to remark, that one can easily locate such examples for all medium-sized n ≥ 9. Since we have exhaustively generated all weighted voting games for up to 9 voters, we were able to collect some additional data on integer representations, see Table 3 . 
Conclusion
We have exhaustively generated all minimum sum representations of weighted voting games for up to 9 voters. By refining the described methods even the full classification of weighted voting games for 10 voters seems to be computationally feasible. An important application of the enumeration of weighted voting games lies in the inverse problem for the power index problem, i. e. determine a weighted voting game whose power distribution is close to a given power distribution [Keijzer(2009) , Keijzer et al.(2010) Keijzer, Klos, and Zhang, Alon and Edelman(2010) ],
